Using the panel data consisting of 142 countries for the period from 1960 to 2014, we assess the nonlinear effects of population aging on economic growth. We find that population aging negatively affects economic growth only when it reaches a certain high level and its negative effects grow stronger as population aging deepens. We also find that population aging has hampered economic growth, during the period of more recent years, especially in developed countries where population aging is quite advanced. This finding suggests that due to the dramatically accelerating population aging in the coming decades, the world, particularly the developed world, may face the challenge of sustaining growth.
Introduction
For the past few decades, most countries have experienced rapid changes in the age structure of their populations. For example, many East Asian countries have experienced a rapid shift in their age structure, from a high youth-age population share to a high working-age population share, and then to a high old-age population share. A rapid increase in working-age population share occurred in these countries during the 1970s and 1980s and this transition contributed substantially to East Asia's so-called economic miracle (Bloom and Williamson, 1998) . Such a period of demographic dividend did not last long, however. These countries in Asia are now experiencing population aging, at a speed faster than in any other regions.
As compared to medium-age workers (more generally working-age population), the elderly participate less actively in labor force, their productivities are lower (Shirbekk, 2014; Liu and Westelius, 2016) , and save less (Park and Shin, 2012; Horioka and Niimi, 2017) . Thus, if the equal number of working-age population is replaced with old-age population while other things being equal, population aging in a country would hamper its economic growth, posing demographic burden. 1 However, previous empirical studies examining the overall impact of population aging on economic growth have often yielded mixed results as reviewed in Nigarajan, et al (2013) . For example, using a panel dataset for the period 1960 -2005 , Bloom, Canning and Finlay (2008 find that the effect of old age on growth is negative in the short run, but insignificant in the long run. Similarly, using the partial adjustment model in a panel framework and a dataset of 80 countries in 1960 -2005 , Lee et al (2013 find that unlike the share of the youth in population, the share of the elderly in total population or relative to the working age population, does not appear to hold back economic growth. More recently, Acemoglu and Restrepo (2017) argue that countries experiencing more rapid aging have grown more rapidly.
In contrast, using a sample of 142 countries for the period 1960-2014, Lee, Shin, and Park (2017) find that population aging has a negative impact on economic growth in both short run and long run. Maestas et al (2016) find that using the U.S. states data for the period 1980-2010, population aging decrease the growth rate of GDP per capita.
Most, if not all, previous studies presume that the effect of population aging on economic growth is linear, irrespective of the level of population aging. However, population aging may impact economic growth negatively only when its level reaches a certain high level and its impact gets stronger as population aging deepens.
One of the major reasons might be due to the changing structure of population. That is, as old-age population share increases, the sum of youth-age and working-age population shares should decrease. Thus, increasing old-age population share may coincide with increasing working-age population if the speed of decreasing youth-age population is fastest.
Indeed, in early stages of demographic shift in most countries, as old-age population share increases, working-age population share also increases. This is illustrated in Figure 1 . As seen in the figure, Japan's old-age population (65 and above) share has been increasing, from 5.6% in 1960 to 26.6% in 2016. During the period, Japan's old-age dependency ratio also increased from 8.8% to 43.9%. However, working-age population increased from 64.5% in 1960 to 69.8% in 1992 and since then began to decrease.
<<Insert Figure 1>> The figure in the right panel also reveals that in the case of South Korea, both old-age share and old-age dependency ratio have been increasing while working-age population share has been increasing, from 53.4% in 1960 to 73.1% in 2015. Only from 2016, did working-age share begin to decrease.
As long as demographic dividend due to the increasing share of working-age population is greater than demographic burden due to the increasing share of old-age population, the "overall" effect of population aging on economic growth may not necessary be significantly negative.
In this study, therefore, we systematically show that the negative effects of population aging on economic growth become visible only when population aging reaches a certain high level and its effects become more strongly visible as population aging deepens.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides information on demographic changes. Section 3 explains the empirical framework, and Section 4 reports and discusses the main results. Summary and concluding remarks are provided in Section 5.
Stylized facts of demographic changes
Data on age structures are collected from World Bank's World Development Indicators online data base. As briefly discussed in Section 1, higher old-age population share may not coincide with lower working-age population share. Figures 2 -5 support this view. Specifically, Figure   2 (A) reveals that countries with greater youth-age share are also those with smaller working-age share. Figure 2(B) , however, reveals that the relationship is non-linear: for the countries with old-age population share of about 10% or smaller, greater share of old-age population appears to coincide with greater share of working-age population. 2 Above the 10 percent level of old-age population share, higher old-age population shares appear to be associated with smaller working-age population shares.
In order to reveal such a non-linear relationship for individual countries, Figure 3 redraws Figure (2B) only for Japan and South Korea. In the case of Japan, until old-age population share reached 12.3% (year 1991) , an annual increase in old-age population share was accompanied by an increase in working-age population share. Since then, working-age population share has decreased while old-age population share has increased. In the case of South Korea, during the smaple period of 1960-2014, population aging progressed while working-age population increased. A similar pattern is also observed with old-age dependency ratio instead of old-age share.
<<Insert Figure 2>> <<Insert Figure 3>> Figure 4(A) also reveals that while countries with greater increases in (five-year) in youth-age population share are those with smaller rates of change in working-age population share. However, Figure 4 (B) reveals that the relationship between changes in old-age population share and changes in working-age population share is not clearly noticeable.
Therefore, Figure 5 illustrates this relationship for three different groups of countries. Figure   5 (A) clearly reveals that among the non-aged countries (old-age population share is below 6.32, the average level of our sample), an increase in old-age population share generally coincides with an increase in working-age population share. However, Figure 5 (B) reveals that for the group of aged countries (old-age population share > 6.32), the relationship appears to be negative and Figure 5 (C) further reveals that such a negative relationship becomes stronger for the group of very aged countries ((old-age population share > 10.0) <<Insert Figure 4>> <<Insert Figure 5>> A very similar pattern is observed even when we replace old-age population share with old-age population dependency ratio which is defined as the ratio of old-age to working-age population. 3 Thus, a simple linear regression may not reveal the true association between population aging and economic growth because when population aging is still at a low level, there is a positive association between the working-age share and economic growth.
Empirical specification

Theoretical consideration
Following Lee et. al (2013) and Lee, Park and Shin (2017) , we assume that the aggregate output is determined by a three-factor Cobb-Douglas production function 4 :
where Y is gross domestic product (GDP), K is physical capital, H is human capital, L is labor force, and A is the productivity level. We normalize equation (1) by dividing both sides by population, P, and take the natural logarithm of both sides, and we obtain ln ln ln ln
where y is GDP per capita and k is physical capital per capita. By taking the time difference, equation (2) becomes:
Equation (3) clearly shows that the growth rate of per capita GDP depends on the growth rate of a country's working-age population share..
It is assumed that L is proxied by the working age population, so that ∆lny = ∆ ln + α∆ ln + ∅∆ ln + (1 − − ∅)∆ ln ( − − ) − ( + ∅)∆ ln (4) where C is the youth population and O is the old population. Thus, Equation (4) also suggests that a country's growth rate of per capita GDP depnde on how youth-age share or old-age share changes.
Following Lee et. al (2013) , equation (3) can be converted to a mian estimable equation as follows:
In the below, we follow the exposition of Lee, Park and Shin (2017) in deriving the estimable equation.
where  is the rate of adjustment (or speed of conversion) which is bounded by zero and one, X is a vector of explanatory variables, which explicitly appeared in Equation (4), and t  is an error term.
As explained in Lee et. al (2013) , 1 , the coefficients on each level variable, represents the long-run coefficient, while 2 , the coefficients on the first-difference variables representa the short-run adjustments to contemporaneous changes in the determinants of ln y . Bloom, Canning, and Finlay (2008) also estimate an equation that is similar to (5), i.e. using both lagged and first-differece terms of demographic variables as explanatory variables. However, as emphasized by Lee et. al (2013) , since their equation includes only the lagged terms of the control variables, our equation is a more general form..
Empirical specification
Since our data set includes a panek of 142 countries, we estimate panel regressions with country fixed effects. We also include period dummies as explanatory variables to control time-fixed global factors such as the global growth, global capital market shocks, and so forth.
Since the productivity of the economy, ln( ) A , is also influenced by trade openness, we also include it as one of explanatory variabless.
Then, as in Lee et. al (2013) , equation (5) As discussed in Sections 1 and 2, the relationship between population aging and economic growth may not be linear. Therefore, we will add a quadratic term of old age population aging in Equation (6).
We use the same dataset utilized by Lee, Shin, and Park (2017) . GDP per capita growth rates at five-year interval are calculated for 142 for the period 1960-2014, using the Penn World 1960-2014. 8 As common in the literature, we minimize the influence of business cycle fluctuations by using five-year averages of variables for eleven sub-periods of (1960) (1961) (1962) (1963) (1964) , (1965) (1966) (1967) (1968) (1969) , (1970-1974), (1975-1979) , (1980) (1981) (1982) (1983) (1984) , (1985) (1986) (1987) (1988) (1989) , (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) , (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) , (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) , (2005-2009), and (2010-2014) . We then calculate the growth rates of GDP per capita for each 5-year interval.
5 Instead of real GDP per capita in local currency, real GDP per capita in US$ is used for the initial level of GDP per capitas, for the sake of comparison across countries. 6 For details of human capital index, see http://www.rug.nl/ggdc/docs/human_capital_in_pwt_90.pdf 7 Among the five types of real GDP in the Penn World Table 9 .0 reports, real GDP using national-accounts (RGDPNA) is recommended by PWT for studies on cross-country growth rates. 8 2014 is the latest year for which PWT version 9.0 is available.
Empirical results
Benchmark results
Columns (1) and (2) of Table 1 report the estimated results of Equation (6). These results are identical to those reported in Columns (1) and (2) of Table 2 in Lee, Shin and Park (2017) .
The coefficients on both the initial value of old population share and on its change are negative and significant. Therefore, population aging may have a negative impact on economic growth not only in the short run but also in the long run. More specifically, a one percentage point increase in the old age share decreases the five-year economic growth rate by 2.0 percentage points) in the long run, leading to a lower steady state income per capita. If the change in the old-age share increases by one percentage point over a 5 year period, the five-year economic growth rate will decrease by 0.034 point (or 3.4 percentage points).
<<Insert Table 1>> Column (2) of the table reports the results when old and young population dependency ratios (YoungDep and OldDep) are used in place of the old and young population shares (YoungSh and OldSh). The results also reveal that population aging has a negative impact on economic growth both in the long run and in the short run. In terms of the size of the estimated coefficients, old population, as compared to youth population, has roughly twice larger negative impact on economic growth. 9
As seen in Section 2, a linear regression may not reveal the true association between population aging and economic growth because when population aging is still at a low level, there is a positive association between the working-age share and economic growth. Column
(3), therefore, reports the results with an addition of a quadratic term of old-age population share (Old_Sh). As expected the quadratic term of old-age population share enters with a negative and significant coefficient, while Old_Sh is no longer statistically significant. A similar result is obtained when old-age dependency ratio (Old_Dep) is used instead of 9 Among the control variables, the coefficient on the initial value of the log of population has a negative coefficient and significant. Countries with a larger amount of physical capital are found to enjoy higher rates of economic growth both in the short run and in the long run.
Countries that are more open to trade are also found to grow faster.
Old_Sh.
Tables 2 Standard errors and 95% confidence levels are calculated by Delta-method. In Column (A), the marginal effect of Old_Sh becomes statistically significant at the five percent level only when it reaches 10 percent of total population. As population aging deepens, its negative marginal effect on economic growth continues to become greater economically and more significant statistically. More specifically, at 10/ 15/ 20 percent level of old-age population, a one-percentage point increase in old-age population decreases the five-year economic growth rate by 1.559/ 2.541/ 3.524 percentage points.
<<Insert As discussed in Section 1, earlier studies in the literature often fail to find statistically significant negative impact of population aging on economic growth. This might be due to the fact that the data used by earlier studies did not include the recent period of high population aging and hence with a relatively lower level of population aging, the negative impact of population aging was not captured.
In order to assess this possibility, we estimate Equation (6) In order to assess if the negative effects of population aging on economic growth have been continuously growing stronger over time, we re-estimated Equation (6) with an addition of an interaction term of the population aging variables (Old_Sh and Old_Dep) and a period variable. Note that there are eleven periods in our sample, as explained in Section 3. As seen in Columns (5) and (6), the interaction terms enter with very significant negative coefficients.
Tables 4 
Effects of population aging in different groups of countries
Rising life expentancy and decreasing fertility rate emerged first in more developed countries.
And hence population aging is more advanced in developed countries than in developing countries. Therefore, the authors have been often concerned with the differences between developed and developing countries, with regard to the effects of population aging on the economy.
If our findings above are correct, the negative impact of population aging on economic growth should be stronger in developed countries where population aging is more advanced. Table 5 reports the estimated results for 29 OECD countries 10 as well as for all other countries. In our sample, the mean value of old-age population share for 29 OECD countries is 12.4, while that for other countries is 4.9.
When population aging is expressed as old-age population share (Columns 1 and 3), the size of its coefficient is slightly smaller in OECD country group but its significance is far greater in OECD country group. When old-age dependency ratio is used, the population aging viariable carries no longer a significant coefficient for non-OECD countries, while it 10 Other OECD member countries which became members after 2010 are not included. They are Chile, Estonia, Israel, Latvia, Slovak Republic, and Slovenia. Even if these countries are also included in the OECD country group, the results are similar.
continues to have a highly significant negative impact on economic growth for the 29 OECD countries.
<<Insert Table 5>> 5
. Summary and concluding remarks
Earlier studies in the literature often fail to find negative impact of population aging on economic growth. This might be due to the fact that in early stages of populatin aging, most countries experiencing population aging do not experience a decline of the portion of their working age population (15-64 years) to total population.
Using the panel data consisting of 142 countries for the period from 1950 to 1994, we have assessed the nonlinear effects of population aging on economic growth.
In summary, our major empirical findings and their implications are:
(i) Population aging hampers economic growth, mostly in countries where population aging has already reached a high level.
(ii) The negative impact of population aging on economic growth becomes greater as population aging deepens.
(iii) As the world continues to enter dramatically into population aging, the world, particulary the developed world, may may face the challenge of sustaining growth.
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